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Abstract: Speciesism should play no role in determining welfare outcomes. Cognition may vary 
within species as well as between species, but broad classifications such as invertebrates are 
functionally meaningless in this context. Cognition should relate to welfare only to the extent that 
it relates to the capacity to suffer or to experience pleasure. 
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It is perfectly reasonable for Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) to call for an end to the 
speciesism that permeates the field of animal welfare. There is no defensible reason to apply 
different welfare criteria to some living beings simply on the basis of their taxonomic 
classifications. This is particularly the case when the classification is extremely broad and 
functionally meaningless. The category of invertebrates covers more than 95% of all known 
species, including organisms as diverse as cephalopods and Drosophila. In the same way that the 
color of one’s skin should not have any bearing on their ethical treatment, the presence or 
absence of a spine should not dictate the ethical treatment of nonhumans.  
M&P focus on the internal, cognitive lives of invertebrates, and seem to be arguing that 
evidence of complex cognition earns animals a higher priority for welfare considerations. They 
review an impressive body of research that indicates greater cognitive complexity in invertebrates 
than is generally attributed to them. Although this insight is valuable in challenging our 
perspectives on invertebrates, a focus on cognitive complexity is dangerous in its 
anthropocentrism. Humans value intellect because they believe it is what sets them apart and 
places them atop a hierarchy of evolutionary superiority (Chapman & Huffman, 2018). But there 
is nothing about cognitive superiority that deserves greater consideration than, for example, 
physical strength, beauty, ecological purpose, and the list goes on.  
Contrary to Levy’s (2020) suggestion that M&P should treat cognitive capacity as a direct 
factor for moral decisions, I would argue that cognition should be considered relevant to ethical 
treatment only insofar as it relates to particular types of suffering or pleasure that an organism 
can experience. This explicit role of cognition in predicting species’ welfare should be highlighted 
rather than using the upper limits of cognition to justify improved treatment. I agree with Levy 
that the issue of consciousness is something of a red herring. This line of reasoning was prominent 
in the commentaries on Chapman & Huffman (2018), which lobbied instead for a focus on the 
capacity to suffer (Shackelford, 2018; Vonk, 2019). Being aware of one’s existence and capacity 
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for death does allow for unique categories of suffering that are not applicable to most 
nonhumans. For example, when humans are aware that they will die at a young age, they lament 
the loss of their future and future missed opportunities (McMahan, 2002). Thus far, there is no 
evidence of this level of reflection on the part of any nonhuman. There is no evidence that 
nonhumans represent death as a permanent absence of both physical and conscious existence 
(Brosnan & Vonk, 2019), thus eliminating a significant category of distress from their capacity for 
suffering in the threat of death. However, there are other aspects of cognition that we are 
probably unaware of that allow other species to suffer in ways that humans do not. 
Although cognitive complexity is highly correlated with phylogenetic relatedness, this 
relationship is not isomorphic. There can be significant variability between species within taxa in 
their need for social interaction, space, varied diet and numerous other factors that influence 
welfare. Giant pandas can be provided with a single type of food (bamboo) while black bears and 
brown bears are generalists and require much greater variety and opportunity to search for and 
extract food. The link between cognition and welfare should be examined at an even finer level; 
the individual rather than the species level. Focusing on species membership alone neglects 
factors such as cognitive impairment and rearing history that affect individual responses to the 
same conditions. A feral dog that has never known human companionship may find human 
attention aversive and stressful whereas an abandoned pet is likely to be comforted by human 
attention (Willen et al., 2017).  
I agree with M&P that whether events are experienced as aversive or pleasurable is more 
important than assessing pain alone. The opportunity to thrive is beginning to be considered an 
important welfare consideration (Brando & Buchanan-Smith, 2018). Distress, fear, boredom and 
many other states in addition to somatic pain are aversive too — and may be more likely to be 
experienced by more complex organisms. The direct link between cognition and psychological 
discomfort and pleasure should be explored more deeply before resting on evidence of cognitive 
complexity alone as justification for moral treatment. 
Of secondary importance is the continued debate in comparative cognition about the 
extent to which animals are merely stimulus-response organisms blindly engaging in behavior 
without a sense of purpose or awareness versus the idea that animals are flexible and capable of 
abstract thought. Comparative psychologists are coming to recognize that this is a false dichotomy 
(Vonk & Edge, in press). Furthermore, this kind of discourse is like a sand-trap; the harder you dig, 
the deeper you become buried in it.  
M&P set this problem aside, stating: “Because this problem applies to all of comparative 
cognition, we will not delve into it here.” One problem with this dismissal is that they cite 
arguments from philosophers alone, neglecting the prominent arguments posed by comparative 
psychologists who are actually engaged on the front lines of this work. As M&P point out, one can 
almost always provide simpler and simpler explanations for purportedly complex behavior, and 
this endless cycle detracts from the main key points in a discussion of welfare. However, 
understanding the precise cognitive mechanism underlying seemingly intelligent behavior can 
help determine an animal’s needs for cognitive stimulation and choice. Comparative psychologists 
aim to do exactly this by using a better understanding of cognition to inform welfare (Clark, 2017). 
The bottom line is that decisions about appropriate welfare for various species cannot be 
based on arbitrary features like the presence or absence of a spinal column or a particular brain 
structure. Humans with a limited understanding of different species’ experiences and capacities 
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must resist the inclination to label some species as more or less deserving than others. Welfare 
considerations should be linked to the capacity to experience various forms of adversity and 
pleasurable experiences. The way that cognition is linked to these capacities is bound to be far 
more complex than any taxonomic distinction would indicate, but M&P bring us closer to 
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